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Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic
Violence, and Workplace Discrimination
Maria Amelia Calaf*
In 1993, Philloria Green's estranged husband broke into her
house, raped her at gunpoint, and severely beat her with a pipe.'
Philloria never imagined that these events would provoke her
dismissal from the doctor's office where she worked. A responsible
and diligent employee, she managed to return to work only a few
days after the violent incident. Upon her return to the office,
Philloria's employer informed her that she was being terminated
because she was a victim of domestic violence. 2
Philloria is not alone in her phght.3 Every year, more than
one and a half million women suffer physical or sexual assault at
the hands of an intimate partner.4 Like Philloria, many of these
* J.D. expected 2003, University of Chicago Law School. B.S.F.S., Georgetown
University. Maria Amelia Calaf worked as a legal intern at NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund in New York City and is currently helping a victim of domestic
violence litigate her sex discrimination claim with the University of Chicago's
Employment Discrimination Clinic.
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1. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Philloria's lawsuit
alleged tort and contract claims against the defendant employer. Id.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Robin R. Runge et al., Domestic Violence as a Barrier to Employment,
34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 552, 553 (2001) (describing a situation where a woman,
who had recently started a new job, requested a day off to obtain an order of
protection against her abusive ex-boyfriend and was fired upon her return to work
for "bringing her personal life into work"); Union Vote Scheduled This Week at
Hospital Under Federal Probe for Labor Practices, Associated Press, Oct. 2, 2000, at
1, available at LEXIS ACADEMIC UNIVERSE, State and Regional Section (describing
how Donna Ray, an employee at St. Mary's Hospital, was terminated after her
estranged husband abducted her and her three children at gunpoint from a street
corner); Martha F. Davis, Legal Director of NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Testimony at the Joint Hearing of the General Welfare and The Women's
Issues Committees, 5-6 (January 26, 2000) (transcript on file with author)
(describing a situation in which a woman was fired for asking her employer to lock
the door of the manufacturing facility where she worked the day after she left her
batterer).
4. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE & CTRS. FOR
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women are not only victimized by their batterers, but also are
penalized by their employers for being in an abusive relationship.
Fortunately, these women are not without recourse. Employers
who discriminate against battered women on the basis of their
condition as victims of domestic violence engage in unlawful sex
discrimination and can be held accountable under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.5
This Article argues that Title VII provides a viable means by
which domestic violence victims 6  can challenge unlawful
discrimination in the workplace and establishes disparate impact
as the best alternative for disputing discriminatory practices. Part
I describes the magnitude of the problem and demonstrates why
violence between intimates is a workplace issue.7 Part II briefly
discusses the local, state, and federal laws available to abused
women who want to bring discrimination claims against their
employers and concludes that Title VII is the most widely
available remedy. 8 Part III applies the three sex discrimination
theories - sexual harassment, disparate treatment, and disparate
impact - to potential domestic violence claims and assesses the
relative advantages and disadvantages of litigating a case under
each one of the theories.9 Part IV reviews the likelihood of success
under each of the three sex discrimination theories and concludes
that the disparate impact theory is the most useful for battered
women.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 9 (2000). In this survey, "intimate partners" include
current and former dates, spouses, and cohabitating partners. Id. at 5. See also
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BETWEEN
INTIMATES 2 (1994) [hereinafter VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES] (estimating that
between 1987 and 1991, an average of nearly two million women were victims of
violent incidents each year); Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of
Domestic Violence: Do They Promote Patient Well-being?, 273 JAMA 1781, 1781
(1995) (estimating that four million women are battered every year by their
partners).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2002). See also discussion infra Parts II and III.
6. I have deliberately chosen to use the term "victim" rather than "survivor" to
describe women who suffer domestic abuse in recognition that although many
women are able to leave their abusers, many others remain trapped in these
relationships. I believe the term "victim" is more accurate as it captures the larger
group of women who suffer physical and emotional abuse at the hands of their
intimate partners.
7. See infra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 47-135 and accompanying text.
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I. Domestic Violence as a Workplace Issue
Domestic violence has reached epidemic proportions. The
Journal of the American Medical Association estimates that at
least one fifth of all women will be physically assaulted by a
partner or ex-partner during their lifetime. 10 The U.S. Surgeon
General reported that domestic violence is "the single largest
cause of injury to women in the United States,"'" accounting for
more injuries than automobile accidents, rape, and muggings
combined. 12
A survey of crime victims by The U.S. Department of
Justice reveals the gender asymmetry underlying this epidemic:
more than ninety percent of victims of domestic abuse are
women. 13 The study additionally reveals that women are six times
more likely than men to experience violence committed by an
intimate and nine times more likely to be killed by an intimate. 14
Other studies show that women are also more susceptible to
serious physical injuries at the hands of an intimate than those of
10. Hyman, supra note 4, at 1781.
11. Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 46 (1992) (quoting Nikki R. Van Hightower &
Susan A. MacManus, Limits of State Constitutional Guarantees: Lessons from
Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 269, 269
(1989)).
12. See 137 CONG. REC. H8782 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Rep.
McDermott) (stating further that domestic violence accounts for roughly one-third
of hospital emergency room admissions for women); Council on Scientific Affairs,
Am. Med. Ass'n, Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medical Practitioners, 267
JAMA 3184, 3185 (1992) (describing a 1985 survey of intact couples, in which
nearly one of every eight husbands acknowledged having carried out an act of
physical aggression against his female partner during the survey year).
13. See VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES, supra note 4 (reporting statistics in the
National Crime Victimization Survey from 1987 to 1991). See also CALLIE MARIE
RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE 8 (2000) (noting that between 1993 and 1998, an average of 937,490
women were victims of intimate partner violence each year compared to 144,620
men during the same time frame).
14. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 1 (1995) [hereinafter
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN]. Although some studies have attempted to refute
these data by trying to demonstrate that women are as likely as men to be
aggressors, such studies ignore data showing that most women who attack their
intimates do so in self-defense. See, e.g., Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse, Husband
Abuse, or Mutual Combat? A Feminist Perspective on the Empirical Findings, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, 103, 107-08 (Kersti Y116 et al. eds., 1988)
(discussing a study contending that women only strike back in self-defense); Joan
Zorza, Letter to the Editor: Women Rarely Batter Men Except When Abused
Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1994, at A22 (emphasizing the importance of
context in evaluating domestic violence statistics).
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a stranger. 15
As these statistics suggest, assaults by an intimate partner
can involve a tremendous amount of violence. Domestic violence
often results in death, rape, maiming, disability, and other
physical injury. 16 For some women, the effects extend beyond the
physical harms, causing substance abuse, severe psychological
trauma, and stress-related illnesses. 17 The consequences of the
violence, however, are not confined to the personal sphere. For
many victims, domestic violence becomes a barrier to employment,
affecting their ability to obtain or maintain a job. '8
A survey of employed battered women reveals that thirty-five
to fifty-six percent of domestic violence victims are harassed by
their abusers at work.' 9 In some cases, the abuser will be a
manager or co-employee who harasses, abuses, or assaults the
victim in the workplace. In many cases, however, the abuser will
not share a workplace with his victim. The intimate will be a non-
employee who intentionally interferes with his victim's
productivity. The batterer may either harass the victim in person
or take actions that interfere with her work without ever
approaching the workplace. 20  For instance, the batterer may
make unsolicited telephone calls, follow his victim to and from
work, or send offensive mail, e-mails, or notes with colleagues. 21
15. See Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 12, at 3186 (describing a report
by the American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs which
calculates that over eighty percent of all assaults against spouses and ex-spouses
result in injuries, compared with fifty-four percent of violent attacks committed by
a stranger). See also TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 4, at 11. Tjaden and
Thoennes report that women are two to three times more likely than men to report
that an intimate partner threw an object at them, pushed, grabbed, or shoved
them. Id. Additionally, women are seven to fourteen times more likely to report
that an intimate partner beat them, choked them or tried to drown them. Id.
Finally, women are seven to fourteen times more likely to report that their partner
threatened them with a gun or actually used a gun on them. Id.
16. See, e.g., Victims' Economic Security and Safety Act, S. 1249, 107th Cong. § 2
(2001); VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 14Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 1.
17. See 137 CONG. REC. H8782 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Rep.
McDermott) (reporting a Seattle study regarding the health-related impacts of
domestic violence).
18. S. 1249 § 2 (reporting that victims of domestic violence are more likely to
depend on welfare and report low personal incomes than other women).
19. U.S. GEN. AccOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 19 (1998). See also
S. 1249 § 2 (explaining that homicide is the leading cause of death for women on
the job and that fifteen percent of all workplace homicides against women are
perpetrated by a husband, boyfriend, or ex-partner).
20. See S. 1249, § 2.
21. This information was obtained during interviews I conducted with battered
[Vol. 21:167
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Outside the workplace, batterers may also engage in conduct
that interferes with their victims' ability to work. Abusers may
destroy the victim's clothing, inflict visible injuries, 22 renege on
promises to provide child care, or keep the victim up late at night
the day before a critical event like an exam or a meeting.23 Even
when the batterer does not directly interfere with his victim
during business hours, the domestic violence itself may interfere
with the woman's ability to perform her job. For instance, studies
show that seventy-five percent of domestic violence victims use
company time to obtain legal and medical services, to call shelters
and counselors, or simply to talk to family or friends about the
abuse. 24
All of these interferences have a tangible effect on the
workplace, both on the women who must tolerate the abuse and on
their employers. According to the Bureau of National Affairs,
domestic violence costs employers an estimated three to five billion
dollars every year in absenteeism, lost productivity, higher
turnover, and increased health care costs. 25 In spite of this reality,
most employers continue to resist addressing abusive relationships
as a workplace issue and insist on treating them exclusively as a
private matter.26 This attitude helps to explain the reaction a
significant portion of employers have when confronted with
women who were harassed by their abusers at work. See also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 7 (reporting research indicating that
abusers come to the work site unannounced or call frequently during the workday).
22. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 7.
23. CATHERINE T. KENNEY & KAREN R. BROWN, NOW LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC.
FUND, REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES: THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON POOR WOMEN,
14-16 (1996). See also THOMAS MOORE & VICKY SELKOWE, THE INST. FOR
WISCONSIN'S FUTURE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS IN TRANSITION FROM WELFARE
TO WORK, 5-6 (1992) (explaining how domestic violence may also prevent a woman
on welfare from re-entering the labor force).
24. Marta B. Varela, Protection Of Domestic Violence Victims Under the New York
City Human Rights Law's Provisions Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of
Disability, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1231, 1257 (2000) (reporting New York State
Labor Department statistics).
25. Norm Maleng, Employers Can Help Stop Workplace Violence, PUGET SOUND
BUS. J., Nov. 14, 1997, at 79. See S. 1249 § 1 (stating that forty-nine percent of
senior executives consider domestic violence harmful to their companies'
productivity, forty-seven percent believe it negatively affects attendance, and forty-
four percent found that it increases health care costs).
26. KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 23, at 3 (citing a survey of corporate executives
conducted by the ABA Commission on Domestic Violence revealing that ninety-five
percent of those interviewed considered domestic violence to be a family matter).
See also Ellie Moon, Domestic Violence Poll Reveals Workplace Secrets, DAILY
PRESS, Aug. 6, 2001, available at http://www.vvdailypress.com/cgi-
binlnewspro/viewnews.cgi?newsid997111271,61504, (describing a study at the local




domestic violence situations. 27 A study by the U.S. General
Accounting Office reports that one-quarter to one-half of all
battered women lose their jobs due to domestic abuse. 28
Advocates for victims of domestic violence have attempted to
remedy this situation by identifying low or no-cost steps that
employers can implement to make the workplace safer for
domestic violence victims. 29 These changes in the workplace
would enable employers to retain these employees, while realizing
significant financial savings.
II. Suing the Employer: Title VII and Other Available
Remedies
In addition to suffering the financial consequences of
domestic violence in the workplace, employers that refuse to
address these issues expose themselves to legal liability. Victims
of domestic violence seeking to obtain a remedy for discrimination
suffered in the workplace have access to a number of local, state,
and federal statutes. 30 For example, at the local level, abused
women in the City of New York may invoke a statute proscribing
all forms of employment discrimination against victims of
domestic violence. 31 Similarly, battered women in several states
enjoy the protection of laws prohibiting employers from firing or
retaliating against them under certain circumstances. 32 Outside
27. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 19, at 19.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., NOW LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, SAFETY PLANNING IN THE
WORKPLACE, available at http://www.nowldef.org/htmiissues/vio/ersastart.shtmlv
(last visited Sept. 18, 2002) (listing the following examples: changing the victim's
telephone extension, routing all her calls to a receptionist or voicemail, allowing the
employee to change desks or work stations, implementing a system where co-
workers or security personnel escort the victim to her car, allowing an employee to
change her job site or shifts, and encouraging victims to file orders of protection
with security personnel); Stephanie L. Perin, Employers May Have to Pay When
Domestic Violence Goes to Work, 18 REV. LITIG. 365, 395-400 (1999) (detailing
guidelines on how to provide a safer workplace for battered women); Robin R.
Runge & Marcellene E. Hearn, Employment Rights and Advocacy for Battered
Women, 5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 17, 18-26 (2000) (listing common sense steps
women can take to protect themselves in the workplace).
30. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
31. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE 8-107.1(2) (2001) (making it unlawful for employers to
refuse to hire, discharge, or discriminate against an individual because of that
individual's actual or perceived status as a victim of domestic violence).
32. Runge, supra note 3, at 554 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West 2000)
(prohibiting employers from discharging, discriminating, or retaliating against an
employee who requests to takes time off to obtain judicial relief or to ensure her
health and/or safety); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 26 § 850 (2001) (imposing a $200
penalty on employers that refuse to grant victims of domestic violence "reasonable
and necessary" leave to attend court proceedings, receive medical treatment, or
[Vol. 21:167
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these jurisdictions, victims of domestic violence must rely on
common law or federal laws to sue their employers. 33
In spite of recent congressional efforts to enact federal laws
specific to this issue, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196434
remains the sole federal option for most battered women. 35 In July
of 2001, both houses of Congress introduced the Victims'
Employment Sustainability Act (VESA).36 This new bill
represents the first federal attempt to specifically tackle the
problem of workplace discrimination against victims of domestic
violence. 37  The legislation proposes to prohibit all forms of
discrimination in the workplace against battered women by
requiring employers to accommodate this group of employees. 38
The bill, however, has received little, if any attention over the past
year, and thus seems unlikely to garner sufficient support to
become law this Congress.
Even if supporters of VESA were to galvanize enough votes to
enact the bill into law, the shortcomings of the proposed statute
obtain other necessary services); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14 (McKinney 2000)
(proscribing employers from discharging or penalizing the victim of a violent crime
for taking time off to appear in court or file an order of protection); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 12-28-10 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee who obtains an
order of protection)).
33. See Perin, supra note 29, at 371-93; Runge, supra note 3, at 553-59
(describing a limited number of state and federal statutory provisions under which
an employer may be liable to a victim of domestic violence).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2002).
35. See infra Part III.
36. See Victims' Economic Security and Safety Act, S. 1249, 107th Cong. §§ 301-
03 (2001). VESA appears as Title III of the Victims' Economic Security and Safety
Act. Id.
37. Compare Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2002)
with S. 1249. Note that VAWA does not specifically provide protection for
workplace discrimination for victims of domestic abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
38. S. 1249 § 303(a) provides in relevant part that:
An employer shall not fail to hire, refuse to hire, discharge, or harass any
individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the
individual ... because (1) the individual involved (A) is or is perceived to be
a victim of domestic or sexual violence; (B) attended, participated in,
prepared for, or requested leave to attend, participate in, or prepare for, a
criminal or civil court proceeding relating to an incident of domestic or
sexual violence ... (C) requested an adjustment to a job structure,
workplace facility, or work requirement, including a transfer,
reassignment, or modified schedule, leave, a changed telephone number or
seating assignment, -installation of a lock, or implementation of a safety
procedure, in response to actual or threatened domestic or sexual violence,
regardless of whether the request was granted; or (2) the workplace is
disrupted or threatened by the action of a person whom the individual
states has committed or threatened to commit domestic or sexual violence
against the individual ....
2003]
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limit its appeal as a solution to workplace discrimination. The
bill's similarities to the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) are
to blame for its deficiencies. 39 Like the ADA, the new bill only
requires employers to offer reasonable accommodations for victims
of domestic violence, with the reasonableness of the
accommodations to be measured in terms of the hardship imposed
on the employer. 40 The bill does not clearly articulate standards
for this assessment, but only provides examples of the factors to be
considered. 41 Empirical research of ADA cases demonstrates the
consequences this ambiguity creates for employees: in the
overwhelming majority of cases, employers were able to defeat
discrimination claims under this statute.42 For potential VESA
plaintiffs, this disadvantage will prove most obvious for those
seeking needed, but expensive, accommodations such as leave
from work and health insurance, because employers are likely to
39. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2002) ("[Tjhe term discriminate includes
... not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an ...
employee, unless [the] entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the] entity") with S.
1249 § 303(b)(1) ("The term 'discriminate', used with respect to the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment ... includes not making a reasonable
accommodation to the known limitations of an otherwise qualified individual ...
unless the employer ... can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the employer .....
40. See S. 1249. § 303(a).
41. See id. VESA specifies that:
In determining whether a reasonable accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of an employer or public agency, factors
to be considered include (i) the nature and cost of the reasonable
accommodation needed under this section; (ii) the overall financial
resources of the facility involved in the provision of the reasonable
accommodation, the number of persons employed at such facility, the effect
on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation
on the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the
employer .... the overall size of the business ... with respect to the number
of employees .... and the number, type, and location of the facilities of an
employer ... ; (iv) the type of operation of the employer .... including the
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the employer ....
the geographic separateness of the facility from the employer .... and the
administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility to the employer ....
Id. at § 303(b)(4)(b). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2002) (mentioning cost of
the accommodation, the overall financial resources of the employer, and the type of
operation of the employer as some of the factors to consider in the ADA inquiry).
42. Cf. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (explaining that "defendants
prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment
discrimination cases decided on the merits" and eighty-four percent of cases on
appeal); Martha Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural
Exclusion, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 348-49 (2000) (describing an ABA




avoid legal liability for failing to provide these accomodations. The
disproportionate advantage VESA tacitly grants employers greatly
diminishes the benefits this bill may present for battered women.
Another problem with the proposed statute lies in its
unwillingness to protect victims of domestic violence in the higher
corporate echelon.43 Section 102 of the Act exempts employers
from extending emergency leave to its earners in the top ten
percent range, subject to certain limitations. 44 This prohibition
undermines the bill's goals of helping all victims of domestic
violence to maintain their jobs and of combating the stigma
attached to spousal abuse. 45
The only advantage the bill presents to battered women
relates to damages. Under VESA, victims of workplace
discrimination would be able to recover more damages than in a
Title VII action, because they would have access to nonpecuniary
as well as pecuniary losses. 46 Nonetheless, the possibility of larger
awards is insufficient to outweigh the bill's shortcomings. The
inherent advantages to employers entrenched in the bill's
language leave Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as the best federal
alternative for victims of domestic violence.
III. The Title VII Claim
Title VII prohibits discrimination against employees on the
basis of their sex with respect to hiring, firing, or other terms and
conditions of employment.47 Battered women seeking relief for
43. S. 1249 § 102(e)(2) (explaining that an employer may deny reinstatement to
an employee who is among the highest paid ten percent of the employees "if such
denial is necessary to prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to the
operations of the employer").
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. VESA states that:
Any employer ... that violates section 303 shall be liable to any individual
affected for (A) damages equal to the amount of wages, salary, employment
benefits, public assistance, or other compensation denied or lost to such
individual by reason of the violation, and the interest on that amount
calculated at the prevailing rate; (B) compensatory damages, including
damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment or life, and other
nonpecuniary losses ... and (D) such equitable relief as may be
appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion.
Id. § 304(a)(1). Cf. LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, §§ 93.01-.05, at
93-1 to 93-25 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that Title VII provides for the award of
limited compensatory and punitive damages to complaining parties in cases where
an employer engaged in intentional discrimination but makes damages unavailable
in disparate impact cases).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2002).
20031
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discriminatory conduct may pursue a Title VII claim using one or
more of three available theories: sexual harassment, disparate
treatment, and disparate impact.48  Each of these theories
presents domestic violence victims with different possibilities for
litigating their Title VII claims.
The sexual harassment theory is unique because it allows a
woman to sue her employer for its agents' behavior. 49 Under this
theory, an employer may be liable for the acts of its employees,
customers, or business partners. 50 This theory enables women
who suffer their batterers' harassment during business hours to
sue their employers for failing to protect them from the abusive
behavior.
Contrary to sexual harassment theories, the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories focus on the employers'
actual practices and policies.51  Disparate treatment allows
battered women to challenge any adverse decisions motivated by a
discriminatory animus.5 2 To sue under this theory, a battered
woman must prove that her employer discriminated against her
because of her sex.53 This evidentiary requirement tends to favor
women employed in organizations that have explicitly
discriminatory practices or policies.
Women who are not employed by organizations that deal
with domestic violence situations can instead use the disparate
impact theory to challenge their employers' discriminatory
practices. Disparate impact differs from disparate treatment in
that the inquiry under disparate impact does not consider intent
but rather focuses on the results of a particular practice. 54 Under
the disparate impact theory, an employer can be held liable for
48. See LARSON, supra note 46, §§ 1.09, 46.01, at 1-67 to 1-70, 46-4 to 46-7
(discussing the three sex discrimination theories).
49. See id. § 46.07, at 46-91 to 46.130.04; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 790-92 (1998) (holding that employees act as the employer's agent, thus
making the employer liable for the supervisory employees' behavior); Kotcher v.
Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The
supervisor is deemed to act on behalf of the employer when making decisions that
affect the economic status of the employee. From the perspective of the employee,
the supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity.").
50. See LARSON, supra note 46, § 46.07, at 46-91 to 46-130.04.
51. See id. § 1.09, at 1-67 to 1-70 (describing the disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories).
52. Int'l. Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(explaining that disparate treatment occurs any time an employer intentionally
"treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin").
53. LARSON, supra note 46, § 1.09, at 1-67.
54. Id. § 20.03, at 20-11.
[Vol. 21:167
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instituting neutral practices or policies that disproportionately
affect battered women. 55 Although all three sex discrimination
theories protect victims of domestic violence from illegal
discrimination, the specific allegations a plaintiff includes in a
claim ultimately depend on the factual circumstances and the
plaintiffs ability to meet the evidentiary requirements of each
particular theory.
A. Sexual Harassment Applied
Sexual harassment claims provide an avenue for battered
women who suffer their abusers' persecution in the workplace.
These types of claims are litigated under one of two theories: quid
pro quo harassment or hostile work environment. 56
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when submission to
or rejection of unwelcome sexual conduct is used as the basis for
employment decisions.5 7 The nature of the quid pro quo theory
requires that the batterer be in a position of authority over his
victim.58 This need for a specific power structure limits the
number of lawsuits that may be brought using this approach.
Only women who work directly under the supervision of their
intimate partners or in a department managed by their abusers
will have the option of invoking this theory.5 9 For instance, to
litigate a quid pro quo claim a battered woman would have to show
that her harasser threatened her with termination if she broke off
the relationship. 60 This specific hierarchical requirement of the
quid pro quo claim makes it more likely that women who are
harassed by their intimate partners at work will bring their cases
using a hostile work environment theory.
A hostile work environment exists whenever an employee's
55. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (establishing that Title
VII prohibits not only overt discrimination but also "practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation").
56. LARSON, supra note 46, § 46.01, at 46-4.
57. See id. § 46.05[2], at 46-51 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (2001) and
explaining that actionable harassment under a quid pro quo theory exists
whenever a supervisor implicitly or explicitly conditions employment on the
employees' willingness to submit to his sexual advances).
58. See id. (explaining that quid pro quo is applicable in cases where the
supervisor harasses a subordinate).
59. See id. § 46.05[2], at 46-51 to 46-54 (discussing examples of situations in
which a subordinate can utilize the quid pro quo framework).
60. Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High Sch. Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp. 862, 869 (N.D.
Ill. 1989). In Keppler a teacher brought a sexual harassment claim after she ended
an intimate relationship with the school's principal. Id. The court found that the
termination was a response to her as an individual and not based upon her sex. Id.
See LARSON, supra note 46, § 46.05[2], at 46-51.
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conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment."'6 To prove that a
workplace culture violates Title VII, a battered woman must show
that the harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [her] employment."62 Simply proving the existence of
a hostile work environment will not suffice. 63 An employer will
only be liable if the court finds that the employer was aware, or
should have been aware, of the harassment but failed to take
prompt remedial action.64 Thus, only women who disclose the
abusive nature of their intimate relationships to their employers
or women who exhibit the physical signs of abuse can successfully
sue under this theory. 65
In spite of the dangers accompanying the disclosure
requirements, 66 the hostile work environment model affords a
viable alternative to a specific group of battered women. This
class includes women who do not work with their intimates, but
suffer regular interferences during the workday. These women
can take advantage of the Equal Employment Opportunity
61. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (explaining that any
unwelcome sexual conduct which interferes with the victim's ability to work
constitutes actionable sex discrimination (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)
(1985))).
62. Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment
Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 437, 446 (2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). The author explains that pervasiveness of the
harassment is "inversely related" to "severity," such that "the greater the severity
of the individual incidents, the fewer there need be to be actionable (and vice
versa)." Id. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sam Sons Produce Co., 872 F.Supp. 29, 35
(W.D.N.Y. 1994); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995) ("even a
single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim's
employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title
VII liability"); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a single incident where a supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her
face against his crotch was sufficient to create a hostile work environment).
63. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (explaining that
no liability should be found against the employer who took reasonable care if the
victim did not attempt to avoid the harm by taking advantage of any preventative
programs).
64. See LARSON, supra note 46, § 46.07[3], at 46-104.
65. Even in such cases, an employer may avoid liability if it can establish that it
exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct the harassing behavior and that the
victim failed to take advantage of available preventive or corrective opportunities.
See id. § 46.07[3], at 46-106.1 to 46.106.3.
66. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the risk of abuse outside the workplace may
increase once the victim has complained about the harassment to her employer.
For victims of domestic violence, disclosure can present a serious risk, since
abusers usually have access to the victims' personal information (e.g., friends and
family's telephone numbers, addresses, employer's telephone number, etc.).
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Commission guidelines, which make employers liable for the acts
of non-employees. 67 Under the guidelines, employers can be held
responsible for all sexual harassment as long as the harassment
occurs at the workplace and the employer is aware of the
conduct. 68 Courts have used the guidelines to find employers
liable for the acts of customers, patients, and business clients.
69
It is possible that in cases involving domestic violence
victims, the employers may try to avoid liability under the
guidelines by arguing that the employee's personal circumstances,
not the job itself, exposed the victim to the harassment. Battered
women might be able to defeat such a distinction if they can show
that their jobs required them to come into contact with their
batterers. In particular, women who work in the service sector, in
jobs that require constant interaction with the public, have a
better chance of undermining the employer's argument that their
jobs did not expose them to the abuse. 70 This specific group of
women stands to benefit the most from the hostile work
environment theory.
Ironically, women who work with their partners, and
experience the harassment in their shared workplace, are less
likely to prevail on their sexual harassment claims than women
who are harassed by non-employees. The Supreme Court's
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.71 accounts
for this difference. "Although [Oncale] is generally known for its
holding that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII,
the decision is more frequently cited for its instruction to consider
67. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2001) ('An employer may also be responsible for
the acts of non-employees with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the
workplace, where the employer ... knows or should have known of the conduct and
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.").
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that the employer acquiesced in the harassment by failing to act
after one of its employees reported she had been raped by a client during a business
dinner); Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001)
(upholding the jury's decision to hold employer liable for patient harassment of
hospital psychologist); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1073 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding the restaurant responsible for acts of customers).
70. Although the following cases do not involve domestic violence, they illustrate
the courts' reaction to evidence that the employer is requiring the employee to come
into contact with her harasser. See, e.g., Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1074 (finding the
employer liable after plaintiff complained that a group of male customers were
making her feel uncomfortable and the manager instructed her to continue to wait
on their table); Rodriguez-Hernadez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 854 (1st Cir.
1998) (finding employer liable for requiring a female employee to acquiesce to a
customer's sexual demands).
71. 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
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social context when analyzing hostile work environment claims."72
In dicta, the Court explained that the impact of particular
behavior on the workplace could only be understood in the context
of the social milieu in which the employees interact.7 3 Without
social context, a court may impose liability on behavior that,
although offensive to most, is acceptable within the confines of the
specific workplace. 74
In cases of domestic violence, social context refers to the
consensual relationship the victims share, or have shared, with
their harassers. 75 This consideration may serve to undermine the
woman's claim - especially if the courts choose to interpret the
harassment as a personal feud, rather than as targeted
harassment based on the victim's gender. Although, to date, no
court has explicitly considered the impact of domestic violence on
sexual harassment cases, litigated claims between former spouses
or lovers illustrate the challenges Oncale's mandate can create for
battered women. Judge Posner's opinion in the Seventh Circuit's
case of Galloway v. Motors Service Parts Operations is one such
case. 76
Rochelle Galloway was a packer in the parts department of
General Motors when she and her co-worker Bullock became
romantically involved. 77 Once the relationship soured, Bullock
started publicly insulting Rochelle by calling her a "sick bitch" in
front of her colleagues and making offensive gestures.78 In a
unanimous opinion, the Seventh Circuit panel held that Bullock's
behavior did not create a hostile work environment. 79 The court
found that, in this context, the harasser's insults reflected his
"exacerbated animosity arising out of the failed relationship,
rather than anything to do with a belief that women [did] not
belong in the work force or [were] not entitled to equal treatment
with male employees." 80 The court interpreted the harassment as
72. Frank, supra note 62, at 437.
73. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82.
74. See Frank, supra note 62, at 437 (explaining that social context is necessary
to determine if a reasonable person would find the behavior hostile or abusive).
75. See Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1165 (7th
Cir. 1996) (considering the nature of the relationship between the harasser and his
victim).
76. Id. at 1165. Although Galloway was decided prior to Oncale, the Seventh
Circuit decision is permeated with the same concern for social context evinced by
the Supreme Court in Oncale. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.




the natural fallout from the breakup.8 1
Although two circuits have disagreed with the Seventh
Circuit's position, their decisions carry little precedential weight
since they were all decided prior to the Supreme Court's review of
Oncale.8 2  The new emphasis on social context is likely to
significantly restrict a battered woman's likelihood of prevailing
on a sexual harassment claim. To overcome the bias against
intimates, plaintiffs may try to introduce evidence that alters the
social context. For instance, a plaintiff may try to bolster her
claim by showing that the harassment started prior to the
separation or that her ex-partner treated other female employees
with similar disdain.8 3 Short of these options, such victims of
domestic violence probably have little opportunity of defeating
Oncale's instruction.
As these cases illustrate, the sexual harassment claim affords
protection to a restricted number of women (i.e., battered women
harassed by non-employees in the service industry). The
evidentiary and disclosure requirements that burden this theory
make it an unworkable model for most women.8 4  Domestic
violence victims who cannot bring their claims under this theory
must use either disparate treatment or disparate impact theories
to litigate their cases.
B. Disparate Treatment Applied
An employer is liable under a disparate treatment theory
whenever a similarly situated male and female receive dissimilar
81. There are additional examples of courts dismissing a sexual harassment
claim between intimates. See, e.g., Succar v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343,
1345 (1lth Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Huebschen v. Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs., 716
F.2d 1167, 1172 (7th Cir. 1983); Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High Sch. Dist. 86,
715 F. Supp. 862, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1989); and Freeman v. Cont'l Tech. Servs., Inc., 710
F. Supp. 328, 330-31 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
82. See, e.g., Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming a
claim against an employer who failed to take action after an employee complained
that her ex-husband, a co-worker, was harassing her at work); Fuller v. City of
Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1525 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding a police department liable for
failing to take action after an officer had complained that her former boyfriend, a
colleague, was using information from the department's personnel files to harass
her at home and work).
83. This evidence may help counter an argument, similar to the one in Galloway,
that the harassment was just the natural fallout of the relationship. See Galloway,
78 F.3d at 1168. Through this evidence the victim may be able to minimize the
impact of the personal relationship on the analysis and establish the harasser's
discriminatory motive. See supra note 75.
84. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (explaining the evidentiary
restrictions of the quid pro model). See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text
(describing the disclosure requirements under a hostile work environment theory).
20031
Law and Inequality
treatment. 85  To successfully establish disparate treatment, a
battered woman must present her case according to the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting model.8 6 This model requires the plaintiff
to first prove her prima facie case by showing she is a member of a
protected class, she was qualified for a position, a damaging action
was taken against her, and that the position continued to remain
open.97 Once the employee has satisfied these requirements, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate some "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" to justify the challenged action.88 Even
if the employer can provide a nondiscriminatory reason to explain
its actions, the employee may still prevail if she can show that the
proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.89
Similar to the sexual harassment model, disparate
treatment is only accessible to a restricted class of battered
women. The cases that arise under this theory entail one of two
possible factual circumstances: situations where battered women
seek a privilege extended to their male co-workers, or where the
same corporation employs both intimate partners and treats them
differently upon learning about their abusive relationship. 90 Only
claims arising under the former scenario tend to favor plaintiffs.
These cases involve situations where the employer openly excludes
women from enjoying certain benefits.9' An example of this would
be when an employer denies a battered woman time off to attend
criminal proceedings or to seek a protective order, though it
regularly grants time off to perpetrators to defend themselves in
criminal proceedings or to serve sentences for violating orders of
protection.92
85. See LARSON, supra note 46, § 8.06, at 8-79 (defining disparate treatment as a
situation where the employer "treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
86. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (announcing
the burden-shifting model under which disparate treatment cases are assessed).
See also Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54 (1981)
(describing the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting model); LARSON, supra note 46,
§§ 8.01-.02, at 8-3 to 8-32.8.
87. See LARSON, supra note 46, § 8.01[1], at 8-3 to 8-4. See also McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
88. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. See generally LARSON, supra note
46, § 8.03[1], at 8-33 (describing the employer's burden to rebut a. plaintiffs case).
89. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804. See also LARSON, supra note 46, §
8.04, at 8-56 to 8-57 (describing how plaintiffs may disprove the employer's
justification. Specifically, the "most commonly employed method of demonstrating
that an employer's explanation is pretextual is to show that similarly situated
persons of a different race or sex received more favorable treatment.").
90. See infra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
91. See Runge, supra note 3, at 557.
92. This example presents only one possible scenario in which this type of claim
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Employers that overtly discriminate against victims of
domestic violence may try to justify practices by invoking the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense. 93 This narrow
statutory defense protects employers that refuse to hire and
employ females wherever such discrimination is essential to the
continuing viability of the employer's business operation.94
Employers may prevail on this defense in cases where, for
example, they show that their decision to exclusively hire men is
based on the fact that only males can perform the central tasks of
a job.95 The exception, however, is not available for the full range
of discriminatory actions and may not be used to discriminate in
the provision of fringe benefits. 96 Because domestic violence cases
are likely to involve fringe benefits, employers facing these suits
will probably be unable to shield themselves from liability by
invoking the BFOQ defense.
Unlike cases involving unequal access to benefits, claims
involving a situation where both partners work for the same
corporation that treats them differently upon learning about their
abusive relationship present more challenges for plaintiffs. In this
context, a disparate treatment claim may arise if an employer,
having learned about the employees' abusive relationship,
suddenly takes adverse action against only the woman or where
may arise. Other possible situations include, but are not limited to, instances
where an employer has an explicit policy of instructing managers to terminate all
victims of domestic violence, but not perpetrators, or where the employer affords
male employees medical insurance for injuries they suffer due to criminal acts, but
fails to provide the same medical benefits to victims of domestic violence. See also
Violence Against Women in the Workplace: The Extent of the Problem and What
Government and Businesses are Doing About It, Before the Senate Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, 107th Cong. (2002), 2002 WL 20319468
(statement of Kathy Rodgers, President, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund)
(discussing examples of specific actions employers take that punish the woman who
is abused but not the abuser).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2002) ("[]t shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis
of ... sex ... in those certain instances where ... sex ... is a bona fide occupational
qualification.
94. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (holding that all women
would be unable to perform the essential duties of an Alabama prison guard
position). See also LARSON, supra note 46, § 11.02[1], at 11-3.
95. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336-37 (finding for an employer that refused to hire
female guards for "contact positions" with violent male inmates).
96. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1986)
(refusing to apply the BFOQ defense to a religious school that denied health
benefits to female employees). See also LARSON, supra note 46, §§ 14.04, 14.06, at
14-26 to 14-27, 14-32 (explaining that employers must afford all employees




the woman suffers the brunt of the employer's retribution
following an altercation in the workplace. 97 In cases exhibiting
these factual circumstances, the rebuttal stage presents more of an
obstacle for the plaintiff than in the benefit cases. To defeat the
employee's prima facie case, the employer only needs to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff, not "persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons."98 This relatively light burden means that
an employer will defeat the prima facie case as long as it can offer
a reasonable explanation for its decision to take more severe action
against the battered woman than her abuser.
In contrast, in order to survive the employer's rebuttal, the
woman must bring forward either convincing evidence showing
that the employer was actually motivated by a discriminatory
animus against women, or other compelling evidence contradicting
the employer's proffered reason. 99 Linda Rohde's case provides an
example of the type of evidence a plaintiff needs to rebut an
employer's justification.100
Linda was a secretary at K.O. Steels where she had an open
romantic relationship with Arnulfo Lopez, a cleaning foreman for
the same company. 10 1 On the evening of July 15, 1976, Arnulfo
went to Linda's apartment and struck her during a fight.'0 2 Linda
immediately informed her company's personnel director of the
incident and was instructed to stay home. 0 3 She returned to work
two days later only to be assaulted by Arnulfo in the office. 0 4 This
time the personnel director asked Linda to take the remainder of
the week off and terminated her the following Monday when she
97. Available cases generally feature a physical altercation between the couple.
See, e.g., Rohde v. K.O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 319 (5th Cir. 1981); RAP,
Inc. v. D.C. Comm'n on Rights, 485 A.2d 173, 176 (D.C. 1984); Complaint at 9,
Valdez v. Truss Components, Inc. (Oct. 23, 1998) (No. CV98-1310).
98. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). ("It is
sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly
set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the
plaintiffs rejection."). See generally LARSON, supra note 46, § 8.03[1], at 8-33
(discussing the employer's burden to produce admissible evidence).
99. See LARSON, supra note 46, § 8.04, at 8-55 to 8-67. See also Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate
Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 31 (1996) (providing a detailed explanation
of the pretext-stage).







returned to work.10 5 The company, however, did not to take any
remedial action against her batterer - Arnulfo kept his job and his
performance appraisals were "meritorious."'106 Linda prevailed on
her Title VII claim because she established a prima facie case for
discrimination and the company did not prove Linda "would have
been fired anyway, in the absence of discrimination."'0 7 Linda's
case was sufficient to undermine K.O. Steel's proffered
justification that its decision to terminate Linda was justified
because of her relatively inferior work record compared to that of
her abuser.108
Not all claimants will be as fortunate as Linda. Many
victims of domestic violence lack access to the necessary
evidentiary information to disprove their employer's contention
that their abusive partners were better employees. In particular,
a woman who does not have a visible problem that interferes with
the abuser's ability to work will find it more difficult to show that
she performed as well as her abuser. For this reason, women who,
like Linda, are involved in a physical altercation with their
intimates at work will generally be better situated to rebut the
employer's proffered justification. In these cases, "similarly
situated" merely requires that both employees are involved or
accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different
ways. 10 9 The narrower focus of this inquiry eases the plaintiffs
burden of proof by diminishing the unequal access to information
between the plaintiff and the employer. Women in this position
will only need to show that following the altercation they suffered
the brunt of the employer's retribution.
An analysis of disparate treatment theory shows that, like
sexual harassment, this model favors only a small segment of
domestic violence victims. Only women employed by organizations
that feature explicitly discriminatory policies or practices are
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 323 (discussing how the employer offered no records of Lopez's work
history, no attendance records, and no payroll sheets). Lopez's supervisor also
admitted Lopez came to work under the influence of alcohol. Id. The supervisor
recommended counseling for this problem. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 322. See RAP, Inc. v. D.C. Comm'n on Rights, 485 A.2d 173, 178 (D.C.
1984) (finding that an employer's decision to fire and reprimand a husband and
wife, respectively, was justifiable because although they were similarly situated on
the job, the wife threatened her husband with a knife during an altercation in the
parking lot). See also Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274,
1280 (lth Cir. 1992) (discussing how a black senior staff nurse and three white
employees were not "similarly situated" regarding a contamination issue).
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likely to benefit from bringing their cases under this theory.110 All
other victims will face significant obstacles, and will need to rely
on the disparate impact theory to successfully litigate their claims.
C. Disparate Impact Applied
Disparate impact occurs when an employment practice,
although neutral on its face, has a disproportionately negative
effect on members of a legally protected class."' This theory may
represent the only option for many victims of domestic violence.
Women who are not harassed by their abusers at work, who do not
want to disclose the abuse to their employers, who are not aware
of how their employers treat male co-workers with respect to
domestic violence situations, who are not employed by an
organization that overtly discriminates against battered women,
or who do not work with their intimates, may only sue under this
theory. In spite of the fact that this theory probably covers the
largest number of battered women, very few victims to date have
used this theory to bring a lawsuit against their employers.11 2 One
such plaintiff - who did not use the disparate treatment model
when filing her claim - was Philloria Green." 3
Unlike disparate treatment cases, the disparate impact
theory does not require a battered woman to prove that her
employer harbors an invidious purpose.1 4 Instead, she can bring
a claim by demonstrating that a specific employment practice or
policy induces a statistically significant disparity between female
and male employees and that a causal relationship exists between
110. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2002). The statute specifies that:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this subchapter only if ... a complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity ....
Id.
112. My research of Title VII claims brought under a disparate impact theory did
not yield any results. I am currently only aware of one claim that has been filed
using the disparate impact theory to challenge an employer's practice and policies.
See Complaint of Jill Kelly Against Bright Horizons Family Solutions, filed with
Illinois Department of Human Rights and E.E.O.C. (Feb. 2, 2002) (on file with
author) (explaining Bright Horizons' termination of Jill Kelly immediately after she
handed a copy of a protection order against her ex-husband to a security officer at
the facility where she worked).
113. See Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
114. LARSON, supra note 46, § 20.03, at 20-11 to 20-12.
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the employment practice in question and the resulting disparity." 5
To challenge a practice, a plaintiff does not need to show a pattern
of discrimination; a single decision by an employer qualifies as an
actionable "employment practice."116
Many disparate impact cases arise in situations where the
plaintiff is seeking relief from exclusionary hiring practices. In
these cases, plaintiffs are required to demonstrate disparity by
pointing to either applicant flow statistics or the relevant labor
market." 7 Domestic violence cases differ in that they would
mostly concern employees who suffer adverse actions subsequent
to employment. This distinction, however, does not alter the
evidentiary requirements during the prima facie stage."6 Even in
the context of domestic violence, a plaintiff would still have to rely
on statistics to demonstrate that the challenged practice
disproportionately affects women employees. For instance, in
Philloria Green's case, she would have to statistically demonstrate
that a facially neutral practice of terminating any employee
injured in a domestic violence incident impacts more women than
men. Similarly, a plaintiff would need statistical evidence to
support a claim that a policy requiring the termination of all
employees who hold orders of protection against an intimate
disproportionately affects women. Given the existing gender
asymmetry of domestic violence," 9 plaintiffs should be able to
easily demonstrate that any practice predicated on an employee's
condition as a victim of domestic abuse will disproportionately
affect women. 120
115. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989)
(explaining that to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must show that a
specific practice caused the statistical disparity).
116. See Council 31, AFSCME v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1992)
(indicating that single employer actions, whether intentional or not intentional, are
actionable under Title VII).
117. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-51 (discussing the proper bases for initial
inquiry in a disparate impact case). The Court stated that:
It is such a comparison - between the ... qualified persons in the labor
market and the persons holding at issue jobs - that generally forms the
proper basis for the initial inquiry in a disparate impact case.
Alternatively, in cases where such labor market statistics will be difficult
if not impossible to ascertain, we have recognized that certain other
statistics - such as measures indicating the ... composition of "otherwise-
qualified applicants" for at-issue jobs - are equally probative for this
purpose.
Id.
118. See LARSON, supra note 46, § 20.01, at 20-3.
119. See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 14, at 1 (reporting that ninety to
ninety-five percent of domestic violence victims are women).
120. See LARSON, supra note 46, § 22.10[2], at 22-48 (explaining that a
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Similar to the disparate treatment theory, the disparate
impact model also allows the employer to rebut the plaintiffs
allegation.1 21  However, the burden for employers under this
theory can be more onerous than under the other Title VII claims.
Once the plaintiff has successfully established a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to present a business
justification for the challenged practice. 122 Here the defendant
may not merely put forward a nondiscriminatory reason, but must
actually prove "that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.... 123
The most significant obstacle plaintiffs face under a disparate
impact theory stems from the existing doctrinal confusion
surrounding the term "business necessity."124  The absence of a
clear definition has created two possible interpretations. 125 The
term "necessity" may be strictly interpreted to require a showing
analogous to a BFOQ - where the employer is required to show
that the discriminatory practice is essential to the continued
viability of the business - or it can be understood to merely require
a showing that the challenged practice is reasonably related to the
job. 126 This subtle but significant distinction is critical to the
discrepancy of four-fifths or eighty percent usually qualifies as evidence of adverse
impact). See, e.g., Woodard v. Lehman, 530 F. Supp. 139, 144-45 (1982) (citing the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1981)).
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2002). The statute states that:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this subchapter only if ... a complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of ... sex ... and the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity ....
Id.
122. See id.. See also LARSON, supra note 46, § 23.04[1], at 23-4.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). See also Albermale Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (explaining that even if the defendant meets its burden during
the rebuttal stage, the plaintiff may still prevail if she can offer a non-
discriminatory alternative that would correct the disparity and meet the employer's
legitimate business goals).
124. Susan S. Grover, The Business Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination
Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 388-95 (1996) (describing the two different
interpretations of "business necessity" and arguing in favor of the stricter
construction of the term). See also LARSON, supra note 46, § 23.04[1], at 23-7 to 23-
8 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 returned courts to the same state of
confusion relating to the term "necessity" in disparate impact cases).
125. LARSON, supra note 46, § 23.04[1], at 23-7 (explaining the inconsistency
between the concepts of "business necessity" and "job relatedness").
126. See id. § 23.04, at 23-7 n.15.1 (explaining that although some courts have
interpreted the provision of the 1991 Civil Rights Act to require the lesser showing,
the term "necessity" suggests that Congress had a stricter requirement in mind,
giving courts the flexibility to adopt the older, stricter standard of necessity
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success of lawsuits brought by battered women.
In domestic violence cases, employers will often attempt to
defend their actions by pointing to the danger the violence may
pose to other employees or clients. For instance, in Philloria's
case, the employer was a doctor who argued that the decision to
terminate her stemmed from his concern for the physical and
emotional well being of his other employees and patients.127 Were
this case to be considered in a court that interprets "business
necessity" as merely requiring a reasonable relation to the
business at hand, Philloria's employer would only have to prove
that he could not reasonably protect his other employees or
patients from Philloria's ex-husband. A defendant in this
situation would face a lighter burden than if the court construed
"business necessity" as strictly as a BFOQ defense. In that case, it
would only need to show that keeping this particular individual
from the workplace would require additional security measures
that it could not afford.
In contrast, an employer in a court that adopts the stricter
interpretation would have to show that the possibility that her
abuser might attack her at work would be sufficient to paralyze
the entire office. 128 To meet this burden, the employer would have
to demonstrate that maintaining safety in the workplace is
indispensable to its ability "to perform the primary ... service it
offers."'129 Similarly, an employer that requires the dismissal of all
employees holding orders of protection against a spouse would
need to show that the existence of this legal restriction hampers
its operations to such an extent that it cannot properly function.
This heightened evidentiary burden would significantly limit
employers' ability to defeat battered women's claims during the
rebuttal stage. 130
requiring employers to demonstrate that the challenged practice is central to their
operation). See Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 821 (2000), Lanning v. SEPTA, '181 F.3d 478, 489 (3d Cir. 1999)
for examples of recent cases interpreting business necessity as a practice that is
reasonably related to the employer's business.
127. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
128. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977) (holding that the narrow
BFOQ exception is only available when the qualification is central to the essence of
the business operation).
129. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (finding customer preference insufficient to disqualify males from working as
flight attendants and counter agents).
130. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 (holding that, for both private and public
employers, a challenged practice must be necessary to safe and efficient job
performance to survive a Title VII claim).
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Although the stricter interpretation would present a
significant obstacle for employers, the more flexible interpretation
still presents employers with a higher burden than the rebuttal
stage under the disparate treatment theory.' 31  In disparate
impact cases, the defendant is required to reasonably justify the
practice or policy, and may not defeat plaintiffs claim with an
unrelated explanation for its discriminatory behavior. 132 This
more burdensome evidentiary requirement presents a considerable
advantage for plaintiff domestic violence victims.
There is one situation, however, where the employer may be
able to prevail even under a strict interpretation of "business
necessity." In Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club,13 3 the Club
successfully used the BFOQ defense to shield itself from liability
after it terminated an unmarried expectant mother. 134  The
organization justified its decision by arguing that the presence of a
single mother was sufficient to undermine its goal of encouraging
girls to avoid teen pregnancy. 35 A social organization with a
similar purpose may be able to successfully employ a role-model-
type defense to dismiss a battered woman. The organization could
argue that the presence of a domestic violence victim would
provide a bad role model for young women who are themselves
susceptible to abusive relationships. The role-model-type defense,
however, will only be applicable in a narrow set of cases and
should not preclude a plaintiff from invoking the disparate impact
theory.
IV. Conclusion
Victims of domestic violence have in the disparate impact
theory a powerful tool to fight discrimination in the workplace.
Unlike the disparate treatment and sexual harassment theories,
which are burdened by a series of limiting requirements, disparate
impact is available as a viable option to almost all victims of
domestic violence. The procedural architecture of disparate
impact accounts for this difference. Disparate impact is not
encumbered with the restrictive evidentiary requirements that
limit the number of potential plaintiffs under its two sister
131. See LARSON, supra note 46, § 23.041], at 23-8 (explaining that the job-
relatedness requirement is not trivial).
132. See id. § 23.04(11], at 23-4. See also supra note 98 and accompanying text
(describing the rebuttal stage under the disparate treatment theory).
133. 834 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 703.
135. Id. at 701-02.
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theories.
In addition to its accessibility, the disparate impact model
offers the advantage of being the only sex discrimination theory
that places a stricter evidentiary burden on defendants than on
plaintiffs. This remains true even for the courts that adopt the
less strict interpretation of business necessity. Under the
disparate impact theory, defendants must actually validate their
employment practices and policies. This increased burden makes
it less likely that employers will be able to avoid liability by
offering pretextual justifications for their discriminatory practices.
Battered women should not continue to overlook the disparate
impact theory, as it provides a powerful tool to challenge an
employer's discriminatory practices, and for many of them may
even hold the key to breaking the cycle of violence.
